One of the most salient impacts of POBR legislation is the observed reduction in the number of full trials that reach the courtroom. Internal investigations, governed by POBR provisions, often involve lengthy and complex procedures intended to safeguard officers’ due process rights. These procedural steps may, in some cases, encourage resolution of cases through alternative means, such as administrative settlements, plea arrangements, or disciplinary actions negotiated outside the public eye. The rationale underpinning these protections is that law enforcement officers—who operate under substantial pressure and risk—should not be subjected to arbitrary or politically motivated prosecution. However, critics argue that these provisions have, as an unintended consequence, streamlined pathways that steer complaints and allegations away from open judicial forums (Rushin, “Police Union Contracts,” Duke Law Journal, 2017; Walker, The New World of Police Accountability, 2019).
Several factors contribute to this reduction in trials. First, POBR statutes often impose stringent procedural requirements on investigators, limiting how and when evidence can be collected. Strict timelines, mandatory notifications, and constraints on investigative methods can inadvertently hamper the ability of prosecutors to gather sufficient, timely evidence to meet the burden of proof for criminal charges. In a practical sense, if critical evidence is delayed, withheld, or rendered inaccessible by procedural hurdles, prosecutors may be more inclined to pursue plea agreements or to recommend that cases be handled administratively. This approach avoids the high bar set by jury trials, where the standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt” and where a jury might be critical of any perceived investigative shortcomings.
Second, POBR-related provisions can create an environment that incentivizes early settlement. When the internal investigative process itself is arduous and time-consuming, departments and municipalities may prefer to resolve cases quietly rather than risk protracted legal battles. The result can be a decline in open-court adjudication of misconduct cases, further reinforcing a pattern in which trials become exceptions rather than the norm. While this may save time and resources, it also raises questions about transparency and public trust. Observers have expressed concern that bypassing trials sacrifices the informative and corrective functions of open litigation, which can expose departmental problems, highlight systemic issues, and inform future reforms (Harmon, “The Problem of Policing,” Michigan Law Review, 2012).
This reduction in trials has broader implications for the legal system. Fewer trials mean fewer opportunities for public scrutiny, judicial precedent, and the detailed fact-finding that occurs when evidence is tested before a judge and jury. The absence of a robust trial process can hinder the development of legal standards and limit the judiciary’s role in shaping the boundaries of acceptable police conduct. Without the guiding influence of trial verdicts, legal frameworks that govern law enforcement behavior can remain static, less adaptive, and disconnected from evolving community expectations or reform initiatives.